Buttonwood's notebook

Financial markets

Central banks

Distortions ahead

Jan 5th 2012, 16:57 by Buttonwood

THE provision of three-year liquidity to European banks late in 2011 was seen as a vital means of support, given that the interbank market seemed to be freezing up again. But it was another signal of how central banks are taking a bigger and bigger role in the economy; as well as providing liquidity to banks, they are a source of demand for government bonds and the key providers of confidence to the equity market.

This blog has worried in the past about how central banks will ever exit from these positions. Few people seem to have agreed with me on this, although their reasons can seem spurious. For example, I have wonderd what will happen to bond markets when central banks sell the bond holdings acquired under QE. Some have responded that central banks will simply let the bonds mature. But this isn't an answer.

In any given year, some proportion of the existing bond stock matures and must be refinanced. The private sector must be willing to absorb the new supply and refinance the existing stock. To the extent the central bank doesn't roll it over, the private sector must add to its bond holdings. The cash effect is exactly the same as if the central bank had sold an equivalent amount of bonds. 

Anyway, the IMF held a conference on post-crisis policy last year. Looking through the papers (which will shortly be published in book form by MIT Press as In the Wake of the Crisis: Leading Economists Reassess Economic Policy), I was pleased to see that Joseph Stiglitz had focused on this point. He wrote that

If the government's purchase of bonds leads to higher prices for stocks and bonds, its later sales should lead to a lower price. If markets anticipate this, then knowing that in the future prices will be lower limits the rise of the prices today.

He adds that there are two significant adverse effects.

First, there will be large potential losses by the central bank. The fact that the central bank does not use mark-to-mark accounting does not make these losses any less real. Second, the attempt to hide these losses (to ensure that they are not recognized) may impede the conduct of monetary policy.

Mr Stiglitz points out that QE may have had further questionable effects. Money may have flowed to where the opportunities look most exciting, such as emerging markets, creating potential bubbles there. Secondly, QE seems to have been used as a means of competitive devaluation (of course, other people can play that game). And QE seems to have destroyed the private mortgage market and ensured that mortgage lending is now largely a government affair, via Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Readers' comments

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CiceroInSantaCruz

Buttonwood,

"QE seems to have destroyed the private mortgage market and ensured that mortgage lending is now largely a government affair".

This, if true, would be a wonderful thing. Government providing affordable housing? Gosh. Government will be providing affordable healthcare and education next as well if we're not careful! Don't breath a word of this to those Tea Party chaps.

oneofthepeople

Its central planning gone wild. Banks are now planning stock prices, home prices, CPI prices, interest prices, etc...

The free market uses price to determine supply/demand, and allocates capital accordingly. Central planning of so many prices is preventing the free market from allocating capital to its most efficient use. Examples of misallocation due to printing include millions of empty McMansions in the first world, and entire empty cities in the third world wilderness. None of the loans extended for misallocation will ever be repaid. Thus the endless bailouts.

PensionActuaryPDX

I agree with your concerns about QE hangover more than your concerns about underfunded pensions as valued under current market interest rates.

On my understanding that QE has driven down bond yields - and therefore inflated marked to market pension deficits - would it be reasonable to assume that the phase-out of QE would then push up bond yields, thereby somewhat reducing pension deficits?

I can only afford to worry about one thing at a time. Please tell me which. :)

4horseman

Interesting points. The underlying issue,tho, is the role of central banks in a globalized economy. An unintended consequence seems to be that they are in a position of enormous power (defining that as the ability to determine the course of events). For example, the ECB can both devalue the Euro (promoting exports) & aid the Euro zone banking system (& governments) by quantitative easing. Although Bernanke could trump the devaluation by his own QE3. Bernanke could probably significantly influence the election in the US. He might want to keep Geithner in place (a former Fed official). I don't mean to suggest any of these individuals are self-interested. Just to point to the power they have, & the role personal relationships might play. All the key central bankers are connected interpersonally by old school ties. So the next question to be considered is how will power be exercised by this elite group of masters of the universe. I would suggest that the elation of power leads to hubris. They wont so much worry about the after effects of policy because they will feel they can control those in due course. Walk a mile in the shoes of a master of the universe & you will get the picture.

jomiku

I was with the post until the last paragraph. That reminded me of going to the hospital for an operation: it hurts, there may be complications and the recovery is difficult but the alternative is worse or I wouldn't do it. To point out that QE has less than optimal effects is silly. Of course it does. Every action has unintended effects. To then say "cause" is more silly: the relation of QE to the mortgage market is far more correlative than causative and that's without noting that without QE even worse might well be the norm today.

As for the primary question, what is needed is some sustained growth because the excess can be bled into supply during periods of optimism. This casts an interesting light on austerity. There is the odd thing that too much debt leads to cutting but that slows growth and makes the too much debt problem worse for the central bank and thus for the banking system and thus for the rest of the economy. This piece of the problem tends to be overlooked.

hankjw

There is the scenario (admittedly unlikely) that austerity will reduce the refinancing burden. One can always hope.

Pacer in reply to jouris

Inflation only lightens the refinancing burden if income rises faster than inflation. Using a less twisted measure of inflation than CPI, real US GDP has been declining almost constantly for a decade or more. It's not surprising when so little of our borrowing is directed to domestic investment in future earning capacity. This means a) not only is inflation not devaluing the repayment burden relative to income; but b) we are seriously making the problem worse by rolling the debt instead of retiring it while we theoretically could afford to without bathing our streets in blood. Then again, if the end game is outright default then the calculus changes somewhat (though it still does not warrant careless borrowing).

RichardRodder

Fund managers have a job to do - invest the money they are given. They need to invest the money regardless of whether they know the market will soon go down or not. Following the exact timing is always beneficial to small traders like myself, but fund managers who lack the freedom of moving quickly might not be able to react to these market changes fast enough.

ShaunP

Great post. Their is really no easy way out of this position. It's very possible that in the future a majority of deficit financing will be done by the Central Bank. In the US I do see this as a likely outcome.

Anyways, the result will be rather interesting, to say the least. Although, terrifying may be a better word.

T.R. Brown

Who cares? The current batch of political executives will likely be out of office by the time it becomes a problem, allowing them to add the title of "Savior of the Markets" to their memoirs while their successors have all of the blame heaped on them for overseeing the popping of yet another government-induced financial bubble.

bampbs

I think that anyone who thinks about it knows that backing out of unprecedented interventions will present unprecedented difficulties, but we'd rather not think about it right now.

About Buttonwood's notebook

In this blog, our Buttonwood columnist grapples with the ever-changing financial markets and the motley crew who earn their living by attempting to master them. The blog is named after the 1792 agreement that regulated the informal brokerage conducted under a buttonwood tree on Wall Street.

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