Feb 1st 2012, 15:05 by M.S.
BEFORE his big speech last week, liberals advised Barack Obama to stay away from arguing about the merits of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ie, the stimulus bill of 2009). While independent economists generally agree that the stimulus saved or created somewhere in the neighbourhood of 2m jobs, it remains unpopular with the general public; the sense was that there was no point engaging on this issue, regardless of the merits. Now ProPublica's Mike Grabell is out with a book-length investigation of the stimulus, titled "Money Well Spent?"
In an interview last week on NPR's Fresh Air, Mr Grabell said the stimulus effort had its good points and its bad points. On the one hand, money funneled to states to forestall budget cuts saved huge numbers of jobs for teachers, firefighters and other employees, and delayed cutbacks in infrastructure spending. He subscribes to the general wisdom that unemployment probably would have hit 12% in 2009 rather than 10% without it. On the other hand, the administration had to drop an idea that almost certainly would have made sense—building a national electric smart grid—because the jurisdictional and red-tape problems made it impossible to implement fast enough. Instead the administration decided to invest in clean energy; but those investments placed their bets too heavily on individual companies, some of which then went bankrupt. In an excerpt from the book on the electric car and battery industry jump-started by stimulus funding, Mr Grabell says the jury is still out: without a rapid pickup in demand for Leafs and Volts (which in turn depends on a big increase in electric charging stations), America's electric-car industry will probably fail to hit critical mass, and it'll wind up relocating to South Korea or China like every other manufacturing industry has.
So, here's the thing. The debate we had about the stimulus probably should have been a lot like the book Mr Grabell has written: a detailed investigation of what does and doesn't work in stimulus spending and whether the government really can jump-start a promising industry through investments, tax breaks and industrial policy. But that wasn't the debate we had. Instead we had a debate about the very concept of whether the government ought to spend money counter-cyclically during a recession in order to keep the economy from collapsing, or whether it should tighten its belt along with consumers and businesses in order to generate confidence in the financial markets and allow markets to clear. We had a debate about whether governments should respond to recessions with deficit spending or austerity.
That was the debate we had. And what's interesting about this particular moment is that while Mr Grabell is writing about what did and didn't work in the stimulus, and Mr Obama is staying away from the topic for political reasons, out there on the barricades what's happening is that the entire argument that governments should engage in austerity appears to be collapsing.
Item 1: Over the past month, Paul Krugman, Brad DeLong, and Simon Wren-Lewis engaged in an interminable duel with Tyler Cowen, Scott Sumner, sort-of Karl Smith (occupying as usual an esoteric position not easily placed on the ideological grid), and probably some other people I'm forgetting—over an old argument by John Cochrane claiming that the multiplier effect of government stimulus spending probably ought to be zero. The argument by Mr Cochrane was a critical document in the stimulus debate, because it was an articulation in more-or-less public discourse by a well-respected economist of a mechanism through which increased government spending could fail to raise GDP or increase employment at all. Essentially every working practical economist and forecaster believed that the stimulus, like any other government spending, would raise aggregate demand, GDP, and employment. Republican politicians were arguing that it would not, and Mr Cochrane backed them up.
Two weeks ago, Mr Cochrane responded to the argument in a fashion that suggested that either he has changed his mind, or he never thought what the expansionary-austerity people claimed he did in the first place.
Let's be clear what the "fiscal stimulus" argument is and is not about.
It is not about the proposition that governments should run deficits in recessions. They should, for simple tax-smoothing, consumption-smoothing, and social-insurance reasons, just as governments should finance wars with debt. That doesn't justify all deficits—one can still argue that our government used the recession to radically increase permanent spending. But disliking "stimulus" is not the same thing as calling for an annually balanced budget.
Nor is it about debt financing of "infrastructure" or other genuine investments. If the project is valuable, do it. And recessions, with low interest rates and available workers, are good times to do it... Stimulus [is] still an economically interesting proposition, and there is a great deal of uncertainty about whether, when, and how well it might work.
Okay. There's a lot of nuance here. But as Noah Smith pointed out in response, if the basic gist is that governments should run deficits in recessions to smooth consumption, deliver social insurance, and take advantage of low interest rates to invest in infrastructure...then the policies Mr Cochrane is recommending here are to the left of anything Congress is contemplating passing right now.
Item 2: Niall Ferguson has spent the last three years arguing, contra Paul Krugman, that America is courting disaster by allowing deficits to balloon its national debt to such high levels, and will have to reign in spending or face a crippling rise in interest rates. Last week, in an interview with Henry Blodget, he admitted defeat.
BLODGET: That is a shockingly optimistic view of the United States from you. Are you conceding to Paul Krugman that over the near-term we shouldn't worry so much?
FERGUSON: I think the issue here got a little confused, because Krugman wanted to portray me as a proponent of instant austerity, which I never was. My argument was that over ten years you have to have some credible plan to get back to fiscal balance because at some point you lose your credibility because on the present path, Congressional Budget Office figures make it clear, with every year the share of Federal tax revenues going to interest payments rises, there is a point after which it's no longer credible. But I didn't think that point was going to be this year or next year. I think the trend of nominal rates in the crisis has been the trend that he forecasted. And you know, I have to concede that.
I could go on. This comes on top of criticisms of austerity policies from the IMF, intense pressure at Davos on the German government to countenance increased spending by northern European countries and looser monetary policy at the ECB, and so forth. To some extent what we're seeing here is the backwash from the euro-zone crisis hitting the American economic debate. If you think that the German-led European solution to the euro-zone crisis is deeply confused, and a lot of Americans do, then you have to be troubled by the ways in which it resembles what austerity proponents would have liked America's response to the financial crisis to have been. Americans are starting to recognise that our recovery is further along than other advanced countries' in part because the way we handled the financial crisis wasn't really so awful. And that includes the stimulus.
The presidential election this year is in large measure a referendum on Barack Obama's economic policies. In the broad terms in which it is seen by the electorate, it's a debate over Keynesian deficit spending versus expansionary austerity. The 2010 elections took place at a moment when people seemed to have lost faith in Keynesianism. The 2012 elections are taking place at a moment when people have lost faith in expansionary austerity.
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Last July / August it should have become abundantly obvious to all that there is no political center left in American politics. Given the 11th hour and 59th minute capitulation on the debt ceiling, which should have been done nine minths earlier, who can predict future stability? Filtering out the noise, debt-to-GDP is not relevant. What is relevant is debt divided by tax revenue. In my extimation Warren Buffet's "quadruple-A" is a toxic "XXX". Government would like to see the economy grow at a 4 to 5 percent annual rate in order to finance vote-buying "entitlements". However, global growth appears to be constrained by inability to produce petroleum at more than a 1.2% annual rate. In consequence we must have a rotational super-regional geographic recession in order to balance demand with limited supply. While global money supply says "Go!" energy says "Stop!" which gives rise to volatility and potentially wide swings in market price. Petroleum is not regulated by price because exporting countries subsidize domestic consumption while importing countries merely inflate.
Suppose lenders tire of negative US Treasury rates? There's a potential for a sharp run-up in interest rates -- a potential crisis of confidence when our government emulated Enron and buyers vacate the window where T-bonds are sold. Once demand disappears and pushed annual interest expense above tax revenue, there's no way out but hyper-inflation. My absolutely wild goess would be that 1 X tax receipts is the amount that could be repaid over multiple years but 15 x income tax receipts is well past the limit. The difference will be inflated away.
US inflation turned $0.04 1913 into $1.00 2012 for a total of 96% debasement. Bernanke is fine with 2% inflation, or 84% debasement in 100 years. Big improvement.
If money doesn't retain its value the public turns to inflation hedges, preferably tax-leveraged and subsidized, which begets vote-buying schemes. That's how we arrived where we are today. We can recycle, repeat or we can fix the problem with truly sound money, but only after the next great financial debacle.
The current political class is not shy to shell out Trillions of dollars or Euros to "save the economy", but never, ever are they capable of paying back debts in good years.
I think Bill Clinton was the only exception to this rule in Europe and the US. Even the supposedly "strong" German government is inching closer to a 100% debt to GDP ratio and certainly not a single Euro or DMark of debt was paid back during the good years of the last two decads. The politicians celebrated when the "Neuverschuldung" ("new debt taken" would go down. So they celebrated when they increased the debt load "just" by 20 billions instead of 60 billions. Never, ever did they celebrate paying back even 100 millions. Because there was not a single event of paying back.
If this does not change, we are on the direct path of Sovereign Bankrupty OF GERMANY !
Hey,
but by all your concerns that is the way how the new economies work.
This is sad but true. And why should all the countries around the world behave different than the US?
And how was the US wonder made of? Just by printing money. And this is exactly the same recipe which the other central banks follow.
The point for the US is: It has lost most of its industry. And China has now the capacity and the ability to produce goods. For that China owns some worthless bucks. But what do the US own? Debts and some (worthless) goods. And to establish new factories will take more time and efforts most Americans currently believe.
When it comes to Germany, it is no model student. But it has a slightly different story
and some debts were due to the reunion. And the reunion still affects Germany.
Most of the new debts were caused by the crises. Contrary to all promises
the financial sector was not made liable for the crises it caused. It are still the banks
which are in trouble. But the world follows the model of the US. Flood them with cheap and cheap and endless money. So inflation shall cure it. And when inflation comes the average will suffer from it.
Worldwide regulation and liability is still missing in the financial sector. And the branch does everything to avoid it. So the governments all around the world take out debts for its banks. If everybody plays this game, why should a country not join in?
But to debate issues look at what is on the US agenda.
There is something the US much smarter than Germany.
Whereas Germans are investing in US bonds, the Americans keep investing in German companies!! However no one in Germany take notice of it and rethink the German strategy.
But to invest in companies is much better than investing in governments.
"Worldwide regulation and liability is still missing in the financial sector. And the branch does everything to avoid it."
First some Grammar correction:
German "branche" == English "sector" or "sector of the economy".
Of course, the amount of wealth destroyed by the financial sector can never be paid back by that sector. All we can do is to prevent something similar happening in the future.
I find it outrageous that you can drive a bank into total ruin (e.g. Royal Bank of Scotland or HypoVereinsbank) and then cash in millions as "bonus" before ejecting yourself into retirment as CEO of this kind of banks.
The current generation of politicians is are incredibly stupid and easy to manipulate by those who can do the sweet siren songs. In other words, banksters.
All the discussion is whether the stimulus is desirable or not. Why is it no discussion taking place whether the stimulus placement was misdirected?
The trillions given to financial institutions could have lead to the industrial recovery of US, if this money was used to subsidize industrial projects. These projects would have had a multiplier effect on the economy which was what was the original concept.
The employment situation would have eased.
The subsidies could have been for basic industries requiring large investments. What little was there was offered to exotic industries like solar panels which folded.
No such multiplier effect was obtained when the trillions reached the financial institutions.
woulda coulda shoulda :)
pay it forward. and don't worry so much.
KEYNESIAN DEFICIT SPENDING VS. EXPANSIONARY AUSTERITY
This is heavy weight economic language but absent of relevance.
Now, it's come down to Keynesian Deficit Spending vs. Expansionary Austerity.
I much preferred sound economic principles like Supply and Demand.
That seemed to work pretty good.
This is a very well written article though I wonder about the message.
The stimulus seems to have helped the auto industry.
In today's Super Bowl almost every advertisement seemed to be an auto ad. Seems the stimulus helped these corporations.
Yet, not so sure about teachers, firefighters, etc. Yes, they initially got a reprieve but now try finding a job as a teacher - very hard to find.
And what about all the college graduates who will never be able to pay off their student loans. The Colleges got paid with government student loans and the students are broke and hounded by collection agencies - their lives shattered in debt.
Seems to me stimulus contradicts the basic principles of supply and demand, and chooses winners, and losers.
I think the 2012 election should be about real issues.
Issues like how can we stop the decline of the USA?
How can we create good paying jobs for Americans?
How can the elderly invest in bank savings and get better than a .30% interest on their money?
How can we end FED interest rate manipulation and dollar devaluation, and along with it possibly the real 8% inflation rate? (Oh, I guess it's 2% when you don't count basic necessities like food, gas, etc.)
How about the folks over 45 who can no longer get employed because corporate America prefers the young and tender, to work them to the bone?
All the important issues of the 2012 election are never even discussed anymore by the politicians or media.
What about the middle class, so derailed.
What about an equitable tax structure? The rich can borrow at near zero interest, invest, make fabulous returns and pay only a 15% capital gains tax.
The average working man or woman earning a salary is paying 35% in taxes, medicare and social security.
Are these not some worthy issues that should be resolved in the 2012 elections?
What about the Wars?
Did we kill Osama Bin Laden or did he kill America, the Western World with the high cost of War? Did we win in Iraq? Are we now promoting or supporting attacks and War on Iran? Have we learned anything?
Seems to me, there are so many important issues for the 2012 election than Sir Maynard Keynes.
Why is it none of the important issues ever get discussed openly with the American masses.
I guess our leaders think the masses are too stressed out to raise these issues or maybe too stupid to understand them. I think not. Americans are catching on!
I sure hope these and other important issues become talking points for the 2012 elections, don't you?
Warmest,
Richard Michael Abraham
Founder
The REDI Foundation
http://www.redii.org
Sorry, but I can't resist a chance to link to Scott Sumner's excellent (as usual) response to this article:
http://www.themoneyillusion.com/?p=12976
"In fairness, smart Keynesians like Krugman knew their plan had flaws, but just imagine what Keynesians would say if we’d had a monetarist president for the last 3 years, and the same path of unemployment. Do you think they’d make nuanced arguments separating out “good monetarists” and “bad monetarists?”"
None of today's candidates is anywhere near being a monetarist. All of them favor the Fed sitting tight. That's why the economy would not be the key election issue for me - at least not in the sense of, how do we "fix" the economy - cause none of these candidates will. We have to judge them on other merits of their economic policies.
"We are certainly further along than the periphery of Europe, but I don’t see what that shows. We are less far along than northern European members of the eurozone like German, Austria and Netherlands. But the US has its own currency, so we really ought to be compared to other developed countries with their own currency. How about Japan, Australia, Canada, Britain, Sweden, Poland, etc? Japan’s a special case that looks really good with unemployment and really bad in terms of growth. We aren’t doing as well as Canada, Australia, Poland and Sweden. We are doing better than Britain, but then Britain is one of the few countries that actually did even more fiscal stimulus than the US. Indeed more than just about anyone. So I don’t see how Britain’s poor performance strengthens the Keynesian case."
That shoots down M.S' main argument most effectively.
"If even the Keynesians can’t seem to get their story straight on Japan; how am I supposed to judge how effective the policy has been? All I know is that their national debt as a percentage of GDP has soared much higher during recent decades, and all that stimulus produced precisely 0% nominal GDP growth in 19 years. And yet we’re being told that fiscal stimulus is “obviously” effective?"
Don't believe it when you're told that "the evidence is on Keynes' side". You have to distinguish between the seperate aspects of Keynesianism. Sure, nominal wages really are sticky downwards. Sure, aggregate demand (or NGDP, as Sumner insists on putting it)does matter. But fiscal stimulus being the tried and tested "cure" for recessions? Not in my history.
"It’s really annoying when Keynesian writers keep implying that only fools think fiscal stimulus is a bad idea. The entire concept of fiscal stimulus fell out of favor in the best universities for several decades. The only argument I’ve ever seen for reviving it is that monetary stimulus is ineffective at the zero bound. But many of the most dogmatic proponents of Keynesian economics, the ones who in early 2009 were telling their readers that there was nothing the Fed could do at the zero bound, are now loudly and relentlessly bashing the Fed for not doing more. That’s right, there’s only one good argument for fiscal stimulus, and even the proponents of fiscal stimulus don’t seem to believe it."
*Ahem* Snap.
Speaking about stimulus being not so efficient do not forget what markets feel when they face: political instability, social unrest (with possible riots included), sharp increase in crime and prison population... and long term costs associated with all these nice things. Do we want it or not since September 2008 America and the World had to deal with a return of "Depression Economics" as Mr.Krugman calls it. As I feel it we all must give him a credit for at least finding a proper name to the stuff we are discussing here.
So Ferguson disagrees with a more knowledgable 'liberal' commentator, makes a bunch of provocative comments, gets a load of publicity, then when it turns out his arguments are nonsense, claims that he's been misrepresented. His self-publicising tricks are getting tiresome.
There seems to be a lot of confusion about what Keynesians believe. They do believe that money spent on even worthless projects increases aggregate demand in depression-like economy, and that government spending to increase aggregate demand is valuable or even essential to returning the economy to state with a full employment equilibrium.
Keynesians do NOT believe however, as some allege, that money should be thrown away on worthless projects just to create greater aggregate demand.
Instead they argue that the added benefit of aggregate demand moves a whole lot of spending from the negative marginal value to the positive. They also argue that we should be quick and aggressive about seeking these spending opportunities, since the economy will only slowly if ever return itself to full employment equilibrium without additional stimulus.
Now ... is that so complicated?
"Keynesians do NOT believe however, as some allege, that money should be thrown away on worthless projects just to create greater aggregate demand."
The question is not what Keynesian economists personally believe, the question is what Keynesian theory logically implies to be effective stimulus - whether indeed "wasteful spending" would theoretically be even quicker at restoring full employment.
"They also argue that we should be quick and aggressive about seeking these spending opportunities, since the economy will only slowly if ever return itself to full employment equilibrium without additional stimulus."
Modern macro, which is somewhat "Keynesian", certainly doesn't imply that all recessions will be severe and prolonged without fiscal stimulus.
All good stuff. Although the term "expansionary austerity" ought always to be preceded by "the myth of"
M.S. has conveniently left out the next part of Cochrane's post:
'Nor is it about debt financing of "infrastructure" or other genuine investments. If the project is valuable, do it. And recessions, with low interest rates and available workers, are good times to do it. That doesn't justify all "infrastructure" roads and rails to nowhere, of course. A good test: If China offers to deliver an infrastructure project at half price, but no "jobs" will be "created," do you still want it? If you say "yes, even more" than it's infrastructure. If you say "no, we need to create jobs" then it's stimulus.
The "stimulus" proposition is that additional spending -- whether needed or not -- raises output and general welfare. Pay people $1 to dig ditches and fill them up again, and the whole economy gains $1.5. Yes, endorsed by Krugman because it "feels like a job" (his back must not hurt like mine does) and by DeLong: "anything that boosts the government's deficit over the next two years passes the benefit-cost test--anything at all."
The "targeted," "infrastructure," and the whole worthy apparatus to monitor the wisdom of "stimulus" spending (see John Taylor) is, in the Keynesian model, beside the point, or at best a smokescreen to befuddle the ignorant masses. It would in fact be better if the money were stolen. Thieves have high marginal propensity to consume, and they can get that "spending" out fast in an economy with few "shovel-ready" projects.'
Cochrane goes on to point out that vocal Keynesians like Krugman and DeLong talk as if there were no such thing as the "broken window fallacy" whilst having the audacity to claim that they are disciples of a "general theory" of the economy, when indeed it would take a very "special theory" to explain why such a basic and universal law of economics sometimes ceases to hold, putting us in a "topsy-turvy world" (Krugman). He also emphasises that the New Keynesian models that they draw upon for intellectual justification have little to do with Keynes' original dogma - they simply take the basic insight of short-run monetary non-neutrality and demand-side recessions and attempt to justify it in a thoroughly modern and rigorous way, leaving us with something that can hardly be presented as populistically as a "Conscience of a Liberal" column.
"If you think that the German-led European solution to the euro-zone crisis is deeply confused, and a lot of Americans do, then you have to be troubled by the ways in which it resembles what austerity proponents would have liked America's response to the financial crisis to have been. Americans are starting to recognise that our recovery is further along than other advanced countries' in part because the way we handled the financial crisis wasn't really so awful."
I thought theirs was a different financial crisis, rooted ultimately in the fundamentally unstable nature of the current Eurozone arrangement itself. Calling the response to it thus far confused, as many indeed do, was supposed to be a comment on how none of the countries can be safe from the storm until the basic problems are addressed - Democracy in America has itself remarked on this.
"The 2012 elections are taking place at a moment when people have lost faith in expansionary austerity."
We'll see about that.
Saturos, your reference to the broken windows fallacy is a complete mischaracterization of the Keynesian position. That's not at all what they believe...
I should be more specific. Nobody is advocating spending with no concern for value or advocating thievery or any of the other nefarious things Saturos claims Keynesians believe.
As Krugman, Delong and Keynes himself all explained explicitly, the burying money in holes plan isn't meant as a serious proposal but rather an illustrative one, and that it is quite desirable to buy valuable things vs not valuable things with stimulus money. Where Saturos sees a smokescreen he's in fact looking at a straw man, in this case one Cochrane has thrown up to hide the fact that he's completely changed his position without admitting his previous one was incorrect.
Sanjait -
The broken windows fallacy is not simply an illustration of the fact that destruction does not lead to prosperity. That was not my point. Bastiat's long and wonderful essay (http://bastiat.org/en/twisatwins.html) on the topic meant to teach the general lesson that positive actions in the economy crowd out negative, "unseen" alternatives - the opportunity cost, or as he puts it the "third man".
So the standard assumption, which holds most of the time, is that when the government wants to "increase the level of spending" in the economy, it can only do so by diverting funds from somewhere else that they would otherwise have gone - the opportunity cost of the activity. Increased public borrowing crowds out private borrowing, *normally*, and taxing A to pay B crowds out a payment to C. Ricardian equivalence, a "logical assumption" about household behaviour, shows that levying taxes in the future makes no difference - the subjects make the same deduction from (intergenerational) lifetime income. So the onus is on Keynesians to explain what is so *special* about a circumstance where fiscal stimulus *can* work - which of the Ricardian premises is false, and/or why S > I. Recessions are a special case, and fiscal stimulus is not a recipe for boosting the economy more generally.
No Keynesian today would disagree, of course. But the way the case is presented in the newspapers, you wouldn't think that fiscal stimulus is an exceptional proposition, far more problematic than suggested by the largely incoherent theory originally put forward by Keynes. Yet the logically sound New Keynesian analysis, which is what these columnists actually rely upon, is far less inspiring - expectations choose the equilibrium? Stimulus works even without deficits? And worst for them, modern macro leaves it far less clear that fiscal stimulus is the right kind of stimulus at all. (http://worthwhile.typepad.com/worthwhile_canadian_initi/2012/01/fiscal-p...)
So "Keynesian Economics" - the kind that is still valid today - is far more complicated than your average newspaper makes out, and the average layperson gullibly consumes ("The economy is C + I + G, right? So when C is down, you gotta step in with more G!") The utility of the spending is, as M.S. points out a secondary problem, and not what Cochrane was arguing about. The merit of stimulus rests not, according to Keynes, *what* you spend it on but on how quickly it circulates - the marginal propensity to consume of recipients. So the thieves argument was a complaint against confusing the theory of fiscal stimulus with the seperate responsibility of prudence in government spending.
By "newspapers", I don't mean the Economist, which is relatively clear on these matters, at least when R.A. is writing.
For posterity, I should add that what I said here isn't quite correct. Fiscal stimulus can "work" even when the economy isn't at the ZLB, by inducing people to hold their wealth in treasuries instead of money-balances, which boosts velocity and total spending. This is in fact what the ISLM model implies. However, there are still problems:
Ricardian equivalence
Political constraints (abuse)
How hard it is to target the unemployed resources
The fact that deficit spending leads to distortionary taxes
The fact that it detracts from the optimal allocation of resources, when monetary expansion would solve any output gap costlessly
The risk of monetization
The fact that, fiscal stimulus has traditionally been argued by Keynesians (and more virulently, the ignorant public) as a recipe for boosting real growth - when in fact even positive deviations from potential output are sub-optimal
Most importantly, the Market Monetarist argument: Under inflation (or nominal income) targeting, the fiscal multiplier is zero. This is implied by the New Keynesian models as well. We have seen the Fed decide how much QE to do contingent on whether fiscal stimulus was forthcoming. Monetary and fiscal stimulus are competing ways to do the same thing (boost AD). Each crowds out the other. Similarly, as Krugman himself demonstrated, expansionary policy which is expected to be temporary, won't affect future AD, which will prevent current AD from rising as well. Injections will be hoarded. This applies to fiscal as well as monetary stimulus.
So whatever fiscal stimulus can do, monetary stimulus will do better. (And the contrapositive - if monetary policy is constraint, then so is fiscal policy, for the same reason.) Thus there is no excuse for a central banker to ever call for fiscal stimulus. There is a good reason why there was a consensus ten years ago that optimal stabilization policy would be fully monetary. The present departure from that consensus is a tragedy - the real "Dark Age of Macroeconomics".
To argue the stimulus saved the unemployment rate 2% is a bit like arguing about the butterfly effect--theory, not proof.
Even if it did, however, to spend billions and only shave 2% off of unemployment is a wretched return on investment. No one can credibly argue that the billions spent on the stimulus would not have been more effectively put to use in the business community.
The author almost hits the mark in his mentioning of the inability of government to work on electric smart grid and its failure at venture capitalism. Government is not suited for quick, decisive, and risky projects.
Government is good at paving roads and setting up regulatory schemes which promote growth. If it would focus on reinvigorating its expertise in those areas rather than dissipating its energies elsewhere we would all be better off. This does NOT mean overregulation.
And here I thought you were going to say: "No one can credibly argue that the billions spent on the stimulus would not have been more effectively put to use [by]...sending checks directly to taxpayers"
The 'business community' DID get the lion's share of of the stimulus, whether from the Fed's discount window, or from one-off tax breaks. How well has that worked? I think you answered that yourself.
Also, I recall a particularly decisive and risky project (if not quick) that changed world history: a little shindig called The Manhattan Project. That project illustrates what we *should* be talking about: Rather than argue what government is good at, we should be arguing about how best to build public institutions of quality, so that ANYTHING the government does is 'good'.
> Even if it did, however, to spend billions and only shave 2% off of unemployment
> is a wretched return on investment.
What an amazingly informative sentence. It tells everyone reading it many things at one time:
1) You have no idea of the scope of a 2% unemployment difference.
2) You know absolutely nothing about economics.
3) You have absolutely no empathy.
4) You haven't the foggiest idea how deficient you are in any of these areas.
Oh, and lest we forget, 5) You're a Republican.
Oh... but I repeat myself.
Question to Krugman and the other neo-chartalists:
If fiscal stimulus is such a success why is it that the unemployment rate is higher in fiscally stimulated USA than in the UK?
Why is it Krugman, when commenting on the UK, harps on about the 1930s. There wasn't a depression in the UK in the 30s - it was worse in the 20s.
I suspect Krugman is yet another superannuated witch doctor.
Are you sure there wasn't a depression in the UK?
"By the end of 1930, unemployment had more than doubled from 1 million to 2.5 million (20% of the insured workforce), and exports had fallen in value by 50%"
I should probably be crucified for citing wikipedia, but this is a quick response to a bad comment.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Depression_in_the_United_Kingdom
You should be crucified for more than that.
The UK economy started to stabilise in 1931 (after dropping the gold standard) and recover properly in 1933. It should be in your article.
"The industrial areas spent the rest of the 1920s in recession, and these industries received little investment or modernisation. Throughout the 1920s, unemployment stayed at a steady one million."
"This led to a modest economic recovery, and a fall in unemployment from 1933 onwards. Although exports were still a fraction of their pre-depression levels, they recovered slightly."
"Unemployment began a modest fall in 1934 and fell further in 1935 and 1936, but the rise in employment levels occurred mostly in the south"
Saying there was no depression at all in the UK is disingenuous. Instead of telling me what should be in there why not actually read it first.
Uh, because there are hundreds of other relevant differences between the UK and the US acting as variables?
Uh, because there was still a depression in the UK in the 30s, even if it was not as bad as it was in the 20s?
Neither yours nor Frank O's answers cut the mustard.
1930-31 was still part of the 20s depression. After that there is no way you can still call it a depression with a straight face if you have a grasp of the facts - even if it is a subjective definition. The UK experience was significantly milder than in the US and growth recovered much earlier. The UK even achieved record (to that date) growth in the latter part of the decade. Sorry if the truth hurts but Krugman needs to be busted on his mythical datapoints.
This article (http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~cromer/great_depression.pdf) is much better:
"The British economy stopped declining soon after Britain's abandonment of the gold standard in September 1931, though genuine recovery did not begin until the end of 1932."
Hope that helps.
According to table 1 in the linked article recovery began in the US and Canada in 1933. Although Britain didn't experience as heavy a drop, at 17% compared to over 40% in the North American countries, due to its already recession afflicted economy starting from a comparative low point that doesn't mean it did not experience a depression as well. That is an excellent article though, thank you.
Britain also had extensive military build up in '37 and onward which influenced its recovery.
The stimulus in America might have been effective if it had been "Top Down" and generated to primarily small banks for mandatory distribution to "Small Business" for local not offshore consumption. Unfortunately more than half of the Stimuls went to Public employees and Unions while the rest went to big business or dissappeared with little effect.
Greece is an interesting comparison because they have more than 50% hired by Federal Government and increasing debt. America has hired more Federal Governemt employess at a historic pace and acquired historic debt. Hello greece
Eh? That's a Mythtake. America has been shedding Federal workers at a rapid clip. Public sector employment has been declining and it's been private sector employment that's increasing. If public sector hiring was at the same pace as private sector we'd have knocked another point off the unemployment rate by now.
Eh? That's a Mythtake. America has been shedding Federal workers at a rapid clip. Public sector employment has been declining and it's been private sector employment that's increasing. If public sector hiring was at the same pace as private sector we'd have knocked another point off the unemployment rate by now.
Would it kill you to use an internet search before making such claims?
Neither of them is true. Not even close...
Stimulus I and II were not great examples of fiscal legislation, and they expanded or created "programs" not "projects". They were good to the extent that they saved some number of teacher/firefighters/police jobs, if the folklore is to be believed. All in all, those who read the bills could see stimulus for what it was - that's why we're done with it, as citizens. The thing that didn't happen was a failure to get construction/housing turned around. You can pour stimulus money down every rabbit hole, but when housing tanks and our political leaders can't summon the will to deal with it, it's just good money after bad.
Both stimulus and austerity (in the sense of so-called ‘expansionary austerity’) in the above sense aim at encouraging the aggregate demand to increase whether directly or eventually.
The biggest flaw lies in there. It is completely wrong to try to target the aggregate demand as long-run policy. The flaw comes from applying the loanable-funds theory to analyses of long-run determinants of interest rates, analysis that overlooks or makes light of speculation or the propensity to hoard.
According to the classical economics tradition, the aggregate demand is the aggregate-supply function, and thus every single level of employment, whether full employment or under employment, is considered to be at a neutral state of equilibrium. The tradition thus insists that an economy can get close to the only stable state of equilibrium, which is at the state of full employment, through encouraging competition towards the state of full competition. That thought completely overlooks how and why full competition is an unreal state, or a state that should not be materialised, in the real world.
One of the most important determinants that hinder the economy from encouraging competition is irreversibility of durable capital-goods such as capital equipment. Those durable capital-goods could not be eliminated further than a certain extent as part of the essential characteristics of the real world. That is why there are the notions of the marginal efficiency of capital and user cost. When the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital has not shifted much, a lower marginal efficiency of capital requires a lower interest rate that would add upward pressures to the speculative-demand for money or, in other words, the propensity to hoard. This discourages the transactions-demand for money, which is considered to be an increasing function of NGDP when the income velocity of money is considered to have been unchanged. Unless the money supply increases in some sufficient manner to make the transactions-demand for money outrun the speculative-demand for money, the NGDP will stagnate by that much. Still, monetarists, such as Ben Bernanke, insist that the transactions-demand for money may increase in any way as long as the NGDP growth is targeted. But, monetarists are then overlooking how the increasingly encouraged speculative demand for money will result after the interest rate (i.e. complex of all the nominal interest rates in the present open market) has reached the lowest possible level in an attempt to meet a marginal efficiency of capital at a point that would prop up the aggregate investment. The situation is a true liquidity-trap in a closed economy and a pseudo liquidity-trap, which Paul Krugman calls a liquidity-trap, in an open economy. In an open economy, the pseudo liquidity-trap encourages speculative asset-lending abroad or speculative asset-purchasing relative to foreign assets, which will someday face insolvencies in the long run, because interest rates cannot count the insolvency risks in full. (Uncertainty lies in here). Still, the economy at home, and either employment or wages, will keep stagnating despite the low interest rate. That as a whole is what Japanisation really is. A long period of Japanisation is foreseen unless we shake off the classical economics tradition.
The central authorities (i.e. the government and central bank) should not benchmark NGDP or aggregate demand when it comes to long-run policy and so called fine-tuning. It should instead prioritise how to improve the schedule to the marginal efficiency of capital as long-run policy, because the notion of NGDP cannot be sufficiently precise with no common physical unit to measure all the goods and services or calculate the net increment of capital equipment within a period. And, there is no such convenient physical unit – in the real world. Attempts to improve the marginal efficiency of capital are what the US should really do – whether by the team Obama or that of a Republican president.
Still, the central authorities must make the most of stimulus and austerity, or aggregate-demand targeting, as short-run policy only to regain market-confidence at large market-fluctuations. They should be implemented with severity and compactness to provide a sufficient surprise to change the then market sentiments. Austerity for short-run policy may sound bizarre, but we may expect austerity with some determined severity, compactness and meticulosity (i.e. meticulosity as a policy that, unlike monetary stimulus typically, requires a certain length of agenda) to work efficiently if we compare the case of Poland (i.e. The Balcerowicz plan) with that of Russia during the early 1990s. The US economy needn’t implement this form of austerity at all, but Italy and Greece must as part of the first step to later move to the second step that is a long-run policy package to improve the marginal efficiency of capital.
I cannot help supplementing my above post:
Worse, the Fed has announced that it should more closely benchmark inflation at around two percentage points.
The inflation targeting will not work efficiently as a long-run policy. The reasons are what I have just said above: It will, instead, work as part of the Bernanke put, attempt of encouraging either NGDP or employment. The NGDP and employment may or may not grow at a sufficient pace with the policy, but it will certainly encourage the speculative-demand for money to outrun the transactions-demand for money at the same time. Much of the increment of the money supply will be used for purchasing speculative foreign assets and speculative domestic assets relative to speculative foreign assets. That policy will thus only exacerbate the Japanisation, or pseudo liquidity-trap, of the US economy.
The Fed needn’t go that far. It has only to maintain the low interest policy without benchmarking NGDP or inflation in a clear manner, and help maintaining liquidity at occasional large market-fluctuations that will come all of a sudden. That is what the Bank of Japan has been doing since Governor Masaaki Shirakawa assumed the office despite attacks by his opponents. That is the maximum that a central bank could and should do. Monetarists get too far instead.
As I stated in the above post, it is the government that should do the further jobs: Improving the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital is an act of resource reallocation (e.g. geographical restructuring at home and institutional reform on financial- and capital-markets) to eventually achieve a more marginal-efficient state of economy, act that market mechanism or the invisible hand cannot conduct by itself. It is largely because of irreversibility of durable capital-goods such as capital equipment and various fixed factors of production such as your personal lives and even families. The classical economics tradition may insist on reducing irreversibility of durable capital goods and cutting fixed factors of production to some sufficient level to get close to the state of perfect competition, but one with common sense must understand that assertion is as impractical in the real world as communism is – in the sense that both the assertion and communism are based on the unreal state of perfect malleability in which one can move without delay or conflict every single economic variables relative to real factors such as rare resources, wages, people, family, local community, country, etc.
In the process of policy-making, we should not talk of an unreal task such as how to get close to perfect competition to an extent theoretically considered sufficient but actually further than the realistic range. When the extent is required, its background theory, no matter how coherent it may be within itself, is based on some unrealistic presumptions that cannot be true for the real world.
Let me go on a bit and cite another important point:
As for Bernanke’s ‘2-percent target’, Milton Friedman would warn Otmar Issing not to apply his theory of monetarism direct to actual policy-making in the real world. (Apparently, Friedman was getting closer to Keynes then). The main purpose of Friedman’s ‘k-percent rule’ is neither reflation nor disinflation but just to avoid some sorts of systematic errors that may arise from highly discretionary monetary policy which may waver at times between different theoretic bases the FOMC (in case of the Fed) members hold.
Therefore, the ‘k-percent’ (for money supply growth) have to be a relatively loose bundle. That might sound familiar to you when you heard Bernanke saying that the 2-percent ‘target’ (for inflation) was not really a target.
Hence, It would be rather dishonest of Ben Bernanke not to clearly state it if he had finally come to understand, even if gradually, Friedman’s above warning: He would still be as much of a flawed monetarism-fundamentalist or anti-Friedman as he would when he was criticising Japan’s monetary policy full of confidence, assumed the office of the Fed chairman full of confidence and implemented the inelastic monetary policy of QE as many as twice to attempt to commit monetary policy to taking initiative in the long-run determinants (primarily of interest rate) full of confidence if he hadn’t still understood Friedman’s above warning.
"jump-start"
If I never hear this over used term again, it wont be soon enough. The financial markets are too big for their britches. The tail wags the dog. Too much of the eocnomy consists of money circulating in the casino market which has nothing to do with the economy that sustains people's lives and prosperity.
BTW isnt expansionary austerity only established to work under full employment, when gov borrowing competes with private borrowing?
Progress can't always be measured, for instance when it consists of policemen or teachers NOT losing their jobs, but it is still an important type of rescue. Perhaps the word "stimulus" is misleading for such actions that help to sustain the status quo, but the money serves a vital purpose nevertheless.
The passage you quote from Cochrane's blog looks strikingly similar to the introduction to his November-2010 paper entitled "Stimulus RIP".
This paper is linked from the post you refer to, and seems to argue against any recent change of mind.
Yes, and also I believe Cochrane's quoted statement
"Nor is it about debt financing of "infrastructure" or other genuine investments. If the project is valuable, do it. And recessions, with low interest rates and available workers, are good times to do it."
is misunderstood by the article writer. He's saying if something is valuable to do, do it if its really needed. And low interest during recessions may be taken advantage of for valuable projects.
I do not see where he is implying that projects should be undertaken just for the sake of stimulus.
This is a little off topic, but its possible if the banks and AIG had not been bailed out, home mortgages could have been picked up by smaller banks for pennies on the dollar. The smaller banks would have been more than happy to reduce the principles and still made a killing.
Home prices would have crashed to levels that people could afford, and the recovery in housing would be fully underway today. Instead, the government tries to keep housing prices propped up. Houses are not worth as much as the government induced bubble made them, so let them fall dimwits.
Right on. And the Federal Government would have had an auto-pilot stimulus plan eating the GSE's share of the losses. Unemployment--at least for lawyers and accountants--likely would have been nonexistent. The bankruptcy process would require armies of those folks and the clerical support that comes with them.
State and local governments, on the other hand, would probably be melting even more quickly given their shortsighted dependency on ever-increasing property tax revenues (and tobacco settlement money). Perhaps the Fed might have seen fit to deploy the many trillions it used to prop up banks instead to a reasonably long (but finite) series of municipal debt purchases.
The beauty of all this is that the debt destruction would have cleared the way for expansionist Fed policy with far less risk of inflation.
Banks are put into receivership. That process already exists via the FDIC. Its a much quicker settlement of a bank's assets than bankruptcy.
So as house prices shot the moon, state and local taxes shot the moon too? Too bad for state and local governments then. They should cut back expenses. Bad idea for the FED to bail them out.
Economic disaster resulting from bank failure is way overblown by the so called financial elite. Its a form of extortion. (visions of Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson insisting TARP had to be passed THAT DAY). Even if they are right, better to let the big banks fail now and take our pain before they get even bigger. The 6 largest banks are now 40% bigger than before the financial crash. So now they are even more too big to fail. Great.
The socialist Obamic Health care is a gigantic black hole.
What a very nuanced and thoughtful non sequitur...