Democracy in America

American politics

The world order

The stakes of American hegemony

Feb 2nd 2012, 20:22 by W.W. | IOWA CITY

IN THE latest edition of the New Republic, Robert Kagan, a senior fellow at Brookings and noted Kagan, serves up a ponderous rebuttal to the proposition that America is in decline. I don't disagree with Mr Kagan that America remains, for the foreseeable future, securely hegemonic, which is the thesis he is most anxious to establish. But I am sceptical of Mr Kagan's assumptions about why American unipolarity must be so jealously protected, which he announces at the outset of his essay:

The present world order—characterized by an unprecedented number of democratic nations; a greater global prosperity, even with the current crisis, than the world has ever known; and a long peace among great powers—reflects American principles and preferences, and was built and preserved by American power in all its political, economic, and military dimensions. If American power declines, this world order will decline with it. It will be replaced by some other kind of order, reflecting the desires and the qualities of other world powers. Or perhaps it will simply collapse, as the European world order collapsed in the first half of the twentieth century. The belief, held by many, that even with diminished American power “the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive,” as the political scientist G. John Ikenberry has argued, is a pleasant illusion.

There is much to quibble with here. It may be that the current global dispensation to some extent "reflects American principles and preferences". If it does, however, it's not because it "was built and preserved by American power", except in a rather trivial sense. The American model of political economy has proved in many ways to be the world's most successful. As the 20th century's main rivals to capitalist liberal democracy failed, polities worldwide looked to the example of Western Europe and North America, and this led to a glad flowering of democracy and prosperity. But America didn't cause the world's numerous socialist and/or authoritarian experiments to fail. Those regimes faltered first and foremost because socialism and authoritarianism tend not to work out in the long run. And America didn't compel aspiring first-worlders to try market economies and democratic governance. The nations of the world could see for themselves what was working and, in their own ways, have mostly followed suit.

If American power does wither, it will be due to America's failure to maintain really first-rate institutions. The ensuing world order would indeed become, as Mr Kagan has it, one "reflecting the desires and the qualities of other world powers". But that's simply because the capitals of the world aren't full of blithering dopes who wouldn't know what to do if Brookings senior fellows didn't tell them. Smart countries will want to emulate those that remain or have become first-rate. And, as far as I can tell, people who become accustomed to wealth and freedom don't have to be bullied and cajoled into wanting to keep it. Because they have grown rich, they'll have the means to keep it. Which is why it's absurd to think that if America loses its lustre, the peoples of the world will inevitably suffer under the dark reign of Russian or Chinese bad guys. Other wealthy, liberal democracies can have huge navies, too, if we'd let them. Mr Ikenberry's alleged "pleasant illusion" looks pleasantly solid to me. 

Mr Kagan gives it his all arguing that the "rise of the rest" does not mean America's not still undisputed king of the hill. But Rosa Brooks, a Georgetown law professor, is right that the skyward trajectory of the BRICs does mean America's relative influence has waned, and that that's a happy development:

[A]s Reagan recognized, a decline in relative American power is a good thing, not a bad thing — if we can turn rising states into solid allies. Remember "Gulliver's Travels"? True, it wasn't much fun for Gulliver to be the little guy in the land of Brobdingnagian giants, but it was even less fun to be a giant among the Lilliputians. Like Gulliver, America will prosper most if we can surround ourselves with friendly peer and near-peer states. They give us larger markets and improve burden-sharing; none of the global problems that bedevil us can be solved by the United States alone.

The global public goods Mr Kagan rightly prizes—peace, stability, unimpeded trade routes—will be more, not less secure if the burden of their provision is more broadly distributed. And America is more likely to remain worth emulating were it to redirect some significant portion of the trillions spent maintaining its hegemony into more productive uses. 

(Photo credit: AFP)

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Konker

"I don't disagree with Mr Kagan that America remains, for the foreseeable future, securely hegemonic"

The US embassy in Iraq has 16,000 employees and is protected by 5.500 security contractors. Because of bad relations between America and Iraq, embassy employees don't much get to leave the compound and interact with Iraqis, reducing their intelligence effectiveness and influence.

A hegemon in the original definition leads because others follow. Large numbers of Americans holed up in closed cities in distant places forced to eat McDonalds or Burger King and watch American tv, not interacting much with locals doesn't sound much like hegemony. It sounds like paranoia.

Handworn

Other wealthy, liberal democracies can have large navies too? Not this large. I mostly agree with you, but the confluence in a single wealthy liberal democracy of a large percentage of the world's arable land (with its concomitant resource riches), this much wealth, this much entrepreneurialism and of this many smart, well-educated and civic-minded citizens is a difficult-to-replicate thing, and therefore so is its armed forces. By contrast, many of the potential alternative wealthy liberal democracies are in Europe, and their track record of working together in the recent economic crises in Europe doesn't bode well for the effectiveness of any potential replacement of the U.S. as global policeman. (Libya notwithstanding; that was a very nearby place that had a fairly small military and no one with any stake in blocking action, unlike Syria in the recent U.N. vote.)

Richard D. Quodomine

As long as two things are maintained:

1) Strong, open, and useful international trade and covenants that are at least known, if not always perfectly enforced

AND

2) Global growth continues so that poorer countries at least have a path forward out of poverty,

then the US can afford to be first among equals. Failing on either of the two above conditions and the world will backslide.

It's a Leontieff-type paradox: wealthy countries produce expensive things because the return on investment is greater. Consequently, a nation which produces only certain raw materials or foodstuffs will not be able to develop a value-added economy. The value-added economy, which creates a chain of suppliers, finishers, accoutnants, service industries, externalities, etc. also creates the middle class in modern economies. So, it is therefore clear to any development economist: a nation must be allowed to develop from a pure raw-material supplier to a supplier of industry and service to the broader global market or be relegated to backwater status.

US foreign economic policy would be wise to engage development of other economies in this manner. They would then be more pre-disposed to American thinking, and one would think, an American-style republic.

Boredome

If America, at the height of its economic and political power, couldnt turn two backwards Muslim nations into anything even remotely resembling stability and prosperity then why do people imagine some rival hyperpower that is 'more evil' will be able to do better?

I wish these neo con nerds would stop trying to bring forward their computer game fantasies into reality, every 10 years there has to be some pointless war that transfers tax payers money into defense contracts and blackwaters and all that other crap without any effect, except maybe the accelerated deaths of thousands of dark people who had the misfortune of being viewed as apt test tube subjects for some balding middle aged PhD.

Konker

Its easy to think, when a liberal is in the Whitehouse that international disputes are relatively manageable because its in everyone's interest to form effective productive relationships. If other powers become wealthier under such a system, so be it. They will contribute more to overall well being.

However when realists capture the Whitehouse and control US power, as happened with Bush and the Neocons and as reflected by Kagan and Brookings (and much of the State Department), the only way to maintain peace is to have a single dominant power that coerces everyone else into line. And if it isn't the USA it will be someone else that the USA will likely not like.

This is where the conflict starts. Imagine US determination to contain and push down a nation the size that China will become over the next 20 years not to mention with its security agreements with Russia under the SCO and that it may be about to tie its economic colours to the European mast as we start to think in terms of a Eurasian economic entity (watch China pivot to Europe as the US tries to squeeze it. Lets see if China helps to fix the Euro crisis).

Things can change quickly. But the US can ensure its own decline most rapidly by trying to maintain domination of a system in which others have become too powerful to dominate.

Malkavian

"But America didn't cause the world's numerous socialist and/or authoritarian experiments to fail. Those regimes faltered first and foremost because socialism and authoritarianism tend not to work out in the long run."

This point can't be emphasized enough. USSR didn't fail because of something Reagan did, or because Soviets were partcularly evil and corrupt. Soviet system was simply not sustainable due to lack of market prices and socialist calculation problem. Even if you were the smartest, kindest, gentlest Communist, the game was rigged against you from the start, and all you could do is turn to alcoholism in despair.

Back in the home country, my grandmother was an aerospace engineer. Her last military project was MiG-25 Foxbat. They used scrap from that process to make washing machines. Now, to a typical Westerner, Soviet washing machines are really awful. This is wrong. If, during doing laundry, you expect to encounter heavy machine gun and surface to air missile fire, Soviet Washing Machine is Right For You!

If you want your washing machine to actually wash clothes, well, that's an afterthought. Politicians decided so. It's not that Soviets couldn't design a good washing machine - there was plenty of talent for that, but because Top Men didn't make it a priority, it never got done. Such examples are countless, and there's only so long that the population will put up with it.

Boredome in reply to Malkavian

"It's not that Soviets couldn't design a good washing machine - there was plenty of talent for that, but because Top Men didn't make it a priority, it never got done." So true. Another good example is this -- for 70 years the Soviets were unable to produce one decent television while the Japanese went from being bombed into oblivion to whipping out the American television industry within 40.

The Soviet Union, despite all the heavy investment in R&D and education wouldnt let its scientist produce goods that anyone but the military wanted. Ever. Technocracy without a free market does not work and the only reason why the Asian state led development models ultimately appear successful was the access to the American consumer who had to be pleased with constant improvements. Unfortunately Putin and his ilk of fingernail pullers are too stupid to realize this and are instead replaying the Brezhnev era on the cheap.

WhiskyTangoFoxtrot

Well if America is declining relative to the rest of the world, we better hope the democratic peace theory holds. In completely unrelated news, I hear Britain and Argentina aren't getting along too well....

jvictor1789

WW you often write brilliant analysis but although I agree that multipolarity when the power players are liberal democracies seems like a fair state of affairs one would aspire to, we may want to point out two problems with that model.

a) The last time such a system was in place was during the Belle Epoque, and it ended in the trenches of WWI. Granted the psychopathy of virulent nationalism has been eradicated in most of the West together with polio, but sometimes economic interest leads to conflict too.Multipolarity is by sheer mathematics less stable than bipolarity or unipolarity.

b)Like Curate´s Egg points out, it is not necessarily the system that is best for the people the one that achieves superior production or greater power.The Huns and Vandals offered a terrible social organization to the people they ruled by comparison with Roman Civilization, and yet they won their 1000 years of darkness.But for FDR, Hitler would have outproduced and outsmarted every other European power,Britain included.The swastika would be atop the Houses of Parliament right now, from London to Cape Town.

The idea that the political system that is best for the people produces the economic system that is best for the people, and that both in turn give birth to the strongest, most productive economy is a liberal myth based on the fact that XIX century England ruled while being one of the most democratic and per capita wealthiest nations at the time(but it wasn´t the only one) and reinforced by Pax Americana in the XX century.

But it is just a myth, for many non-liberal wretched nations have been extremely powerful in the 8,000 year history of Civilization.Most, in fact.

And if the political and economic system that is best for its people triumphs, how come then that the USA of today is so far behind and has no prospects of copying the Swiss model of Democracy, or the Scandinavian model of economic development?

Nations become powerful through complex processes not well understood, nor easy to manipulate.Nobody would have thought in 1985 China would overtake America in the 2010s-and probably double America in the 2020s.Nobody predicted 1989 (well, Norman Macrae in his 1985 WWIII book did, but it was more of a propaganda tool than a real prediction)

I´m just not as optimistic.

On the other hand, if nation states have trouble achieving balanced systems that prevent them from causing war and destruction to its citizens,and if they have a poor record of organizing themselves internally to maximize public good, then please explain what good are they for.

The time may have come to dismantle them and create less problematic ways of organizing the pursuits of the Human race.

World government would be the worst possible option,though.

guest-iwoinso in reply to jvictor1789

Your examples of systems which were economically beneficial but politically hopeless are simply wrong. The average Hun led a lot better life than the average Roman on almost any measure you care to name - life expectancy in Rome was in the low 20s. The Germany economy under Hitler was SPECTACULARLY badly run from the late 30s on - it's actually the reason he lost the war. Both examples are precisely because the common man had no say in how things were done - elites ruled in their own interest.

jvictor1789 in reply to guest-iwoinso

I must disagree. Albert Speer managed to double German production in 1944 compared with 1943.

As for the Huns and the Vandals having a better standard of living than the Romans, that´s absurd.If so, why did they come to steal the fruits of civilization.We are talking of illiterate and hungry barbarians whose only quality was their ability to use violence to take away from productive peoples what they themselves were unable to create.And once they achieved through force the feat of ruling more civilized lands and peoples, since they were intellectually unable to grasp the complexities of civilized life, they simply destroyed the cultures they ruled, bringing them down to their horrid level of ignorance, superstition, violent extortion and primitivism, and thus cities were abandoned, population decreased and became ruralized, and 1000 years of abject poverty, utter injustice and inconceivable ignorance ensued.

Charlemagne himself could not read.

obinnna75 in reply to jvictor1789

Soviet Russia undid Hitler, not FDR. After Kursk, Germany was as good as defeated. You could argue it was done with US weaponry, but its not all about materiel; Percival's force in Singapore outnumbered and outgunned the Japanese 3:1, we know how that went.

jvictor1789 in reply to obinnna75

Russia and all the Soviet Republics contributed to Hitler´s defeat with the lives of twenty million of its citizens. The US lost by comparison .4 million.

I support your caveat, but it is not central to the issue at hand.The point is that a system that was totally undemocratic and ultimately "bad" for the people it ruled defeated far more humane counterparts, namely France, Belgium, Norway,The Netherlands...

In fact Stalin achieved so much yet he was also in the "bad" system category, reinforcing the point I was making.

bampbs

What are you, a Brie-eating Chablis-drinking Francophile Surrender Monkey ?

Me too. Let someone else be Sheriff, or at least let's hegemon some countries into full-time Deputies.

stick and rudder

Great post. One comment though... It's our strength now (economic and militarily) that enables us to shape our allies into the "peers" that we want them to be. If we lose influence, we better hope that our allies (that we will rely upon more and more to shape the world how we would like it) remain strong, vibrant, and free in a western fashion, and not in league with the state-capitalist nations that offer financial freedom on one hand, and political suffering on the other. Our strength offers stability, and while I totally agree we need strong allies, I hope it's a case of them coming to OUR level, and not us falling to theirs.

JGradus in reply to stick and rudder

Well, I am not sure the Chileáns will agree with you on that ;).
But actually, the Swiss has always been very much for tending their own garden. But personally, I would say that Britain, and maybe on their sort of french way, France, has done as much as America to promote to modern liberal democracy. And Norway has done very much for their relative size.

It has been a group effort, really :)

on a per capita basis, the Swiss with the Red Cross, international mediation and democratic example have done far more than their share.

But that wasn´t the point. The point was that internally Switzerland is far more democratic than the US.

McJakome in reply to Human Child

Do you like what China is doing for democracy N. Korea, Tibet and Sinkiang? China has always been or striven to be the hegemon, imagine what the world will be like if they succeed, especially with Soviet [er, Russian] support.

typingmonkey

I agree with much in this article, but the only "pleasant illusion" prevailing here is that liberal democratic powers are especially benign. Face facts. America and the West have always been perfectly ready to sacrifice the sovereignty and human rights of weaker nations for the "universal value" of lower gas prices. You can't deny this. Heck, we'll even topple a government because we want their bananas.

So yes, the BRICs will rise, and America's relative power will fall. If Americans continue to act like bloomin idiots, our absolute power will fall too. But for the peoples of the world, this will not really matter. Realpolitik and gunboat diplomacy feel exactly the same regardless of the flag on the gunboat.

Put another way, Iran doesn't hate us because China pays them to. Iran hates us because they hated our Shah.

hamilton 2.0

First of all, WW seems to be under the impression that the US has discouraged our allies from naval buildup, when we've actually spent most of the past 50 years actively trying to get NATO to spend more on non-US militaries; realistically less than half-a-dozen European countries could afford more than a glorified coast guard. Naval and air forces capable of guarding the sea lanes against anything beyond Somali pirates are extremely expensive (look at the price tags of the latest US/Russian weaponry, then consider that for most of those systems the logistics/maintenance/manpower costs dwarf the purchase cost...).
Secondly, history shows that institutions affect global norms/behavior because the countries with the biggest sticks are backing them, not because 8 out of 10 global citizens admire them- witness the difference between the UN and the League of Nations as one example. The power of example is real, but it pales compared to the power of self-interest; consider that in several of the likely gainers of lost US influence the relevant self-interest might well be defined as party or even individual success before national greatness. Also consider that even among countries friendly to the US there is significant frustration with "colonialist-dominated" institutions, regardless of whose interests the institutions serve.
Ultimately, WW is being a panglossian optimist and assuming that whatever institutions arrive will be the best and most representative institutions possible; looking at history, I suspect that economic/military power will override the factors he cites, and history shows clearly that having an optimal economic system (let alone optimal politics) is only one among several factors in achieving that economic and military power.

Curate's Egg

W.W., you seem to be arguing that if the American power declines and its world order goes along with it, it is not worth saving anyways, since it will be because the Americans failed to keep competitive institutions that others wish to copy.
This, I think, is not a valid argument to make. The Soviet Union did not replace Britain as one of the two superpowers because it was any more competitive or legitimate; on the contrary, the Soviet Union became a superpower DESPITE the fact that it was a messy tyranny (although it was able to pull the wool over the eyes of western intellectuals for some time).
The hard truth is that power does not necessarily equal moral legitimacy, or even competitiveness. If you are big, and if you are reasonably functional, you will be able to act as a world power. And if you are REALLY big like China, then the bar of competitiveness/moral legitimacy that you need to meet is lowered even further.
China could be an economy twice as large as America's with half the per-capita productivity, and conceivably still with a Communist dictatorship. But Beijing will still be in a position to move the world away from the American order of democracies and liberal capitalism. I am not sure if that is a desirable outcome.

Pacer in reply to Curate's Egg

Once China has the means (soon if not already) and resolve (harder to gauge) to project force on the political path of other countries, I see no reason why they would not promote democracy for the same strategic/self-interested reasons the Americans have (divide and distract and conquer).

If anything I find it less likely that China would thwart the democratic processes of other countries--as America has when it thought that to be the expedient route--because they tend to take the longer view and be more aware and wary of blowback.

McJakome in reply to Pacer

Which explains China's keeping North Korea poor and totalitarian because the alternative would be a large, modern and liberal democratic state, Unified Korea, on its border. [Or does it?]

Pacer in reply to McJakome

North Korea's principal value to China is a buffer against the U.S. military assets deployed in S.Korea. And the penninsula isn't particularly resource-rich. When I laid out the cynical argument for powerful countries to foster democracy in other countries, it mainly related to resource rich countries. I doubt there would be much response from the U.S. or China if Uruguay went the way of secular dictatorship...

McJakome in reply to Pacer

I take your point, however, South Korea went from poor country to G20 in two generations, despite the destruction caused by North Korea and China. Their resources were people and Confucian respect for education.
I guess, you could say that a country capable of that feat could be dangerous under certain circumstances. However a "buffer state" need not be kept in dire poverty under corrupt and inhuman rule. Even the Soviet Union's buffer states in Europe got better treatment from them than NK does at the hands of China.
BTW the US would not be there if it hadn't been for aggression by NK and China. The US would have allowed a neutral united Korea, but China insisted on a Communist one under the present monstrous NK regime.
Finally, you say China would have no reason to thwart democracy in neighbors, however that posits a democratic Chinese government, and the present regime regards any hint of real democracy as a danger to the dictatorship of the politburo, which is unlikely to change without a bloody revolution of the French variety.
One last point, neither the Communist or previous Nationalist and Imperial governments of China were prepared to allow Tibet, Mongolia, Sinkiang, Taiwan, etc. alone. China has always been the Asian hegemon, and the desire to be such has not disappeared, nor is it likely to disappear with regime change.

Pacer in reply to McJakome

Yes, S.Korea's economic miracle, though helped by favorable policies from the U.S., must be principally due to the people and culture because it is not rich in natural resources (other than fisheries and geography). Much the same could be said of Japan.

As for why the Kim dynasty has persisted, or why their subjects remain so poor, I think those things go hand in hand. And both are facilitated to the U.S. and PRC policies of isolating the dictatorship (and thus insulating it somewhat from internal revolutionary threats). Much of the same could be said about Cuba since 1959.

I don't think it's a precondition that China be democratic for its foreign policy to tolerate or encourage democracy elsewhere. The U.S. aggrandizes its own form of 'democracy', whatever that means, but has variously supported (and thwarted) every form of government on earth. Foreign policy, just like domestic policy, is subject to the expediency of its makers.

I am sure that when the PRC/CCP leadership feel that theirs and/or the country's best interests are served by further rights for citizens, they'll allow it (people there are far more free than even 10 years ago). If the country's interests move too far too quickly from the party's--well, it could be bloody. I don't have enough first-hand knowledge to gauge how far apart they may be in China, but I suspect that the U.S. is probably closer to a peasant revolution than is China.

McJakome in reply to Pacer

"the U.S. is probably closer to a peasant revolution than is China."

Well, I now know your "orientation" :)
In order to have a peasant revolution, one has to have peasants. Russia and China still have peasants; and according to reports China has peasant revolts rather frequently, though they may be called "rural disturbances."

Despite the best efforts of the rich and corporations [if you will pardon what appears to be Marxist rhetoric] the lowest levels of US society not only have full rights, they are armed and dangerous. They can and do vote, though they may be unduly influenced by FOX/GOP propagandists.

While neither the programmed and loyal to the [Republican] regime TEA Party nor the genuine grass roots "Occupy" seem likely to upset the US state, neither has been possible in China since Tien An Men.

Ruling elites, whether CPC or GOP, never give up their privileges without putting up a fight. I doubt the US elites would try a Tien An Men, since the result of Kent State was disastrous for them. Also, there are so many guns in the hands of people who distrust the government, that a revolt here would make the French revolution seem like a tea party.

CiceroInSantaCruz

"reflects American principles and preferences"

Nope. It reflects European principles and preferences, exported to the New World by European colonists. But I will give America this much credit: they do a great job of marketing those principles to the rest of the world. Whenever I hear President Obama say "win the future", I think of Hollywood.

jomiku in reply to CiceroInSantaCruz

I go further: it reflects America's self-definition that the world functions according to principles America insists are somehow only its own. I don't mean to be or sound anti-US but our "principles" are no different than those of other countries once one excludes the outlyers such as the Stalinist USSR, Maoist China. It isn't just that Europeans brought these general principles to this hemisphere; it's that these are the principles practiced elsewhere.

Anakha82 in reply to jomiku

I'm not so sure about that. It's not only Maoist China that (generally) places the best interests of society over the rights of the individual. Even much of Western Europe does not practice radical individualism to the degree that the US does (at least in terms of economic freedom).

European principles and preferences like what? Nazism? Fascism? Communism? Monarchy?... those don't really seem like the sort of principles and preferences reflected by the America I know. On the contrary, it seems more often that not America is in the business of setting right the outcomes of European principles and preferences.

RestrainedRadical

Agree with the first point that the fate of the universe doesn't depend on American hegemony. But as to the loss of relative influence, surely it's better to be Google than to be GM. Sure, the US may still be better off than before in absolute terms just as GM may be better off in absolute terms than it was 100 years ago so it's not something I want to prevent but the loss of market share isn't something to celebrate. It's not a good thing when the US has to face more competition for resources.

Sorrythatpennameistaken

How did it work with Roman Empire? It all depends who takes the crown next. In the absence of true equality between states of the world, we live under conditions of effective state monarchy, sometimes oligarchy, with the most powerful states ruling and influencing others. And monarchy can be great or horrendous, depending on who is on the throne...

Pacer

Yes but in the multipolar world can Americans continue to consume many times their 'equal' share of the earth's material outputs? That's your $64,000 question.

We want democracies because we think they're less apt to pursue war against our (corporate) interests--not because we desire for them to be rich and have the means to bid up the price we pay for their bananas, copper, oil or labor. But of course we're of two minds on this--once again divided among the 1% and the rest. The former owns the means of production.

Whatyouknow in reply to Pacer

There are many imponderables and complexities in this globalization scenario. But this isn't one of them.

A world in which 4+ billion people are able to eat $2 bananas daily is a world with a much better lifestyle even for the currently rich.

That's because commodity demand and demand for finished goods rises in tandem. Anyone producing anything wanted anywhere will be able to buy a boat load of those bananas if they have a ready market of 4 billion affluent consumers.

Whatyouknow in reply to Pacer

There are many imponderables and complexities in this globalization scenario. But this isn't one of them.

A world in which 4+ billion people are able to eat $2 bananas daily is a world with a much better lifestyle even for the currently rich.

That's because commodity demand and demand for finished goods rises in tandem. Anyone producing anything wanted anywhere will be able to buy a boat load of those bananas if they have a ready market of 4 billion affluent consumers.

Pacer in reply to Whatyouknow

In an infinite world you'd be right. But let's say that daily banana production is only 2 billion and cannot be increased without sacrificing other valuable production, and furthermore 10% of the world has gotten accustomed to eating 10 bananas per day (and they're not inclined to reduce consumption of other things to pay higher banana prices).

I'm not saying it's wrong for currently-poor folks to get richer. But it is counterproductive for most of the currently-rich folks to support that trend. Only the elites in the rich countries benefit from this expanded distribution of purchasing power. And even they ought to worry about the limits to growth.

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