Technocracy

THE average senator represents 3,000,000 Americans. But senators are allocated two to each state, which means that Alaskan senators each represent about 350,000 Americans, giving Alaskan residents political influence out of all proportion to their size. In 2005, one of those Alaskan senators, Ted Stevens, nearly succeeded in winning the state federal funding for a $400 million bridge connecting an island with just 50 inhabitants to the mainland, replacing the existing ferry service. the absurdity of the earmark led to a popular uproar that resulted in the removal of funding for the "bridge to nowhere" from the appropriations bill in which it was contained. Sadly, the controversy did not lead to a rigourous cost-benefit analysis of the other measures in the bill.

My colleague at Democracy in America is not fond of the idea of a National Infrastructure Bank, which would consider transportation projects on a merit basis and which is designed specifically to get legislators out of the transportation planning business. He writes:

Now, I certainly understand the desire to insulate one's own cherished pet projects from the vicissitudes of the democratic appropriations process. However, an argument for withdrawing matters of infrastructure, of all things, from the domain of democratic authority suggests equally persuasive arguments for similarly immunising defence spending, entitlement spending, spending on subsidies to "strategic" industries, etc. If we generalise Mr Pearlstein's reasoning, we end up with, at best, a ruthlessly rational and efficient Singapore-style technocracy, which wouldn't be so bad, but isn't anybody's idea of liberal democracy. More likely, we would end up with a system even more corrupt, corporatist, and inefficient than the one we've got, but with fewer of the protections afforded by democracy.

This is not to say nothing should be immune from democratic discretion. Our basic rights should not be subject to the whims of majorities. And monetary policy is bound to lead to disaster unless central banks are afforded a good deal of independence from the exigencies of electoral politics. Yet high-speed rail is not among our basic rights and policy regarding "smart electric grids" is not in any relevant respect similar to monetary policy. A better general theory of the circumstances under which independence from democratic politics is justified would be useful here. But it seems clear enough that if we can't trust democracy do infrastructure, we probably can't trust democracy, period.

I think my colleague misunderstands what such a bank would and would not do. A decent approximation of its function comes in the Tiger grants that made up a portion of the stimulus. Congress funded the programme, determined its scope, and retains the ability to oversee its execution. Officials from the Department of Transportation accepted applications for portions of the funding and judged projects on a competitive basis, according to pre-established criteria. Congress delegated its ability to choose individual projects to technocrats. That's basically what an infrastructure bank would entail.

In fact, Congress does this sort of thing all the time, and often when it recognises that necessary actions will have uneven economic impacts. When the legislature found it necessary to close many military bases, it appointed a special panel to determine which should go, based on a rigourous consideration of costs and benefits. Otherwise, Congress would have either failed to make the necessary cuts entirely, or would have cooperated to spread the cuts evenly, sparing small military towns but leaving the military with bases it doesn't need or can't use effectively (and wasting taxpayer dollars). In general, transportation funding should go where the people are, as that is where transportation needs are greatest. But the people aren't spread evenly across the political landscape, and so the use of a political body to allocate funds leads to waste.

The funny thing about this is that episodes like the bridge-to-nowhere fiasco undermine confidence in democratic institutions, while the success of the Base Relocation and Closing panel probably increased public trust in the idea that Congress can be counted on to handle tough decisions. One of the benefits of democracy is that it's likely to instill in a country's leaders an awareness of their weaknesses and limitations, relative to leadership in autocratic states. If this leads them to better understand in which cases technocratic administration is preferable to legislative micro-management, then that's a result we should all feel good about.

Basically, Congress realises when it's likely to screw something up and, wary of electoral punishment, is occasionally wise enough to outsource those decisions. But in all cases it sets budgets and retains oversight responsibilities, and it can always reassert its authority. A national infrastructure bank wouldn't be a step on the road to technocratic or corporatist tyranny. It would represent a functional democracy in action.