The TSA security leak

Business travel

The TSA security leak

Dec 12th 2009, 18:53 by The Economist | WASHINGTON DC

EARLIER this year, America's Transportation Security Administration, the agency responsible for airport security, published an improperly redacted version of its operating manual on the internet. After travel blogger Seth Miller noticed the error and another blog, Boing Boing, publicized it, the agency finally admitted the mistake to the Washington Post on Wednesday. Here's the Post's summary of what got leaked:

The 93-page TSA operating manual details procedures for screening passengers and checked baggage, such as technical settings used by X-ray machines and explosives detectors. It also includes pictures of credentials used by members of Congress, CIA employees and federal air marshals, and it identifies 12 countries whose passport holders are automatically subjected to added scrutiny.

On Monday, the TSA posted a response to the news on its blog:

TSA has learned that an outdated version of our Standard Operating Procedures document had been improperly posted to the Federal Business Opportunities Web site. TSA took swift action to remove the document when this was discovered.

The version of the document that was posted was neither implemented nor issued to the workforce. In fact, there have been six newer versions of the document since this version was drafted. Standard Operating Procedures change regularly as intelligence provides information on new threats and we find better ways improve security.

So how did this mistake happen? TSA's employees don't know how to properly redact Adobe PDFs. Boing Boing's Cory Doctorow explains:

Unfortunately, the security geniuses at the DHS don't know that drawing black blocks over the words you want to eliminate from your PDF doesn't actually make the words go away, and can be defeated by nefarious al Qaeda operatives through a complex technique known as ctrl-a/ctrl-c/ctrl-v. Thankfully, only the most elite terrorists would be capable of matching wits with the technology brilliance on display at the agency charged with defending our nation's skies by ensuring that imaginary hair-gel bombs are kept off of airplanes.

Harsh words. But this is serious business. Over at the Atlantic, Marc Ambinder asks whether the TSA's mistake compromised a secret intelligence program, WOMAP. (A senior intelligence official tells Ambinder that the damage won't be "significant" or "lasting.") In any case, it's high time that Adobe send some folks over to DHS for some refresher training on Acrobat. Properly trained employees wouldn't have made such a silly mistake.

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UHSmqmHET3 Dec 13th 2009 19:35 GMT

It isn't serious at all, and if it is, it is TSA's fault. Knowledge of TSA's screening procedures should make no difference to the ability to penetrate them, and if it does, the screening procedure is wrong.