Dec 12th 2011, 10:38 by N.B. | BERLIN
JOE SHARKEY, the New York Times's business-travel columnist, often sets the tone and subject of debates in the broader business-travel community. So it's best to pay heed when he introduces his readers to a new idea or controversy. Last week, he did just that, raising new questions about the effect that the broader use of international airline alliances is having on travellers. Here's an excerpt:
Some critics say that the alliances have allowed some airlines to dodge international antitrust regulations and effectively merge on major routes. But it’s clear that alliances’ domination of the international travel market is growing.
Or as Michael Boyd, of the consulting firm Boyd Group International, put it: “In 10 years, it might not make much difference whether it’s United or American flying the airplane. It will be competition among Star, Oneworld and SkyTeam.”
The industry has a term for this trend — “metal neutral” — which Mr. Hedlund said means that “we don’t care who you fly on,” as long as it’s a partner that shares revenue, even one that operates the entire trip itself.
You should read the whole column, but as most business-travel veterans already realise, the fact that airline alliances are an increasingly important part of the international travel landscape isn't necessarily a bad thing. For one, air travel has traditionally been a low-margin business. (Matt Yglesias, Slate's Moneybox blogger, noted earlier this month that "[c]umulative earnings across the history of American passenger aviation are negative $33 billion.") If we accept that businesses in other sectors need to become multinationals to remain competitive, why wouldn't we accept the same changes in air travel? Low margins can be good for travellers, but the costs of a sclerotic and fragmented international airline landscape may outweigh the benefits.
Even if you don't think stronger airlines are a worthwhile goal or you worry about anti-trust issues, there are still some reasons to like alliances. Perhaps most important for business travellers are the benefits and perks that international alliances can offer. It's inconvenient to maintain separate frequent-flyer accounts on a dozen different airlines. But alliances are increasingly making that a problem of the past. If you're an elite frequent flyer on one airline in an alliance, you can usually expect to be treated as such by its partner airlines. That's good. And no business traveller or corporate travel manager is going to complain about how alliances have made bookings and connections easier.
Still, not everyone is happy with the rise of the alliances. Mr Sharkey closes his piece with a quote from Bruce Hedlund, a now-retired captain with American Airlines, the OneWorld alliance member that filed for bankruptcy last month:
“For passengers,” [Mr Hedlund] said, “nothing will change other than a potential deterioration of the already mediocre level of service provided by employees who have been beaten down for so long that it is hard for them to come to work with a positive outlook.”
I hope he's wrong.
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I think this article misses an important piece of context, mentioned in passing in some of the comments above. Given the archaic restrictions on ownership of airlines enforced by so many countries, it is impossible to establish a real multinational air carrier. The big EU-based groups are attempting to establish the framework for this as far as current rules allow IAG, AirFrance-KLM etc. The alliances were established explictly as merely an intermediate step to a future of internationally deregulated airline ownership. That may not happen in our life-times but it may also become less relevant.
The Middle East carriers continue to grow rapidly while completely eschewing participation in any alliances. Travellers whose routes are concentrated around the Atlantic might be missing the significance of this. Emirates is now the largest international carrier in the world and still growing rapidly. They have achieved such a scale with their network that any new additions can be assured to bring value. They have been, for some time, the largest carrier between Europe and Australia. Their direct connections to more than a dozen cities in India allow the massive Indian disapora to get exactly where they want to go bypassing India's horror-hubs in Delhi and Mumbai. They fly to more countries in Africa than any other airline by far (just think about that). Their strong presence in many European secondary cities allows flyers to bypass Europe's congested hubs. One-stop same-airline connections on countless city-pairs such as Prague-Perth, Guangzhou-Luanda, Buenos Aires-Bangkok, Karachi-Houston are only available on Emirates.
If this sounds like a commercial for Emirates well it definitely isn't. As a long-time top-tier frequent flyer with them I am not a fan of their service. Their business class, especially, is mediocre, below the levels even of many European carriers. They cram in more seats in all classes especially on their workhorse 777. Clearly their publicity and brand management are excellent as they somehow have a premium image (though just check the Skytrax reviews). Nevertheless, I am in awe of the ruthlessly efficient way that they have attained scale, leveraging a decent but matchable advantage in location near (but not at - missed opportunity Cairo and Beirut) the fulcrum of three continents.
Although their accounting is not completely transparent, I think their claim to have been profitable for all but one year of their 26 year existence is very credible. The accustaion that they receive susidised fuel is propounded largely by the ignorant - Dubai has had no oil for years. Emirates do benefit from some market-distorting advantages, particularly in the cost of acquiring new aircraft due to export credits from the EU and US (nice use of taxes) and the financing rates they can secure as a government-owned entity (even the Dubai government). Their labour costs are lower than European and North American-based carriers and they don't have to worry about unions. But these are incidental advantages compared to the scale and critical mass that they have now achieved.
Emirates look unstoppable. Alone, for most of the world's population in it's fastest developing regions, Emirates will be able to more than match the best network propositions of any of the alliances. As a single company with a single owner they are also able to respond much faster and more efficiently to changes than alliances (think US versus EU). Indeed the competitive threat from Emirates, and to a lesser extent Qataria and Etihad, may well force some of the regulatory changes that will enable the old airline alliances to start to evolve into proper multinational companies. But it may be too late to be relevant.
What I don't understand is how, given Air China is in Star (which has a near-monopoly already on US to China flights) and China Southern in Skyteam...how it China's third full international airline (China Eastern) was allowed to join Skyteam (which also includes major operators of Asian flights such as Air France-KLM and Delta) and not either the third major alliance oneworld or in partnership with other "up and coming" airlines (Kingfisher, Jet Airways, Virgin, etc.), an outcome that would have fostered competition and increased convenience?
Perhaps it's too early in the game, but I don't think the industry is headed to a metal neutral end point. That may be the case in terms of some limited back-end operations and revenue sharing, but not from the standpoint of passengers. Comparing services and (dis)comforts of US Airways versus Singapore Airlines, it should be obvious that passengers would care which partner they are flying on. Even a simple thing like the airport lounge. At many international airports alliance airlines have lounges right down the hall from each other. Both are accessible to frequent flyers depending on status. Yet, one lounge can be so much better than the other. You would think for cost cutting purposes, there would be an expectation of consolidating such services. And, how many phone calls does it take to get an upgrade on an alliance/codeshared flight using another airlines' frequent flyer miles?
The only way the industry will achieve true metal neutrality is not through alliances but through cross-border mergers, which national governments including European ones will not allow. But, as United's merger with Continental shows even when the government allows mergers to occur labor relations and management styles prevent guaranteed profitability.
And thus the reason US and AA must merge - US needs out of STAR given the overlap and dominance of UA/CO and AC.
In North America, DL/NW SkyTeam, UA/CO STAR and AA/US OneWorld would provide sufficient competition and global virtual netowrks.
Regionals are being consolidated by Republic Airways Holdings (RJET) Pinnacle Airlines (PNCL), SkyWest (SKYW) and AA Eagle / DL Comair.
Michael Wm. Denis
Vice President, Strategy & Consulting
InfoTrust Group
http://www.linkedin.com/in/michaelwdenis
As long as I can still avoid QANTAS I'll be happy with however it works.
as a U.S. researcher, funded primarily by U.S. federal agencies, these alliances have become a headache. I am required to fly a U.S.-flagged airline when traveling on federal funds. My institution (at least -- not sure about the letter of the law) has interpreted this to mean that I cannot take an itinerary with a non-U.S.-flagged leg, even if the leg has a codeshare flight number with a U.S. airline.
This has effectively limited me to flying U.S. Airways, with a tiny and oft inconvenient scheduling.
Fortunately I only have to travel internationally for work every other year or so. This is a minor detail of all this that ought to be addressed, though.
Oh dear, but this is not a fault of airline alliances - but rather of U.S. federal agencies. Is it really sensible to pay double price and annoy own employees with inconvenient scheduling only for the benefit of getting 1% back in taxes?
I, for that matter, am a satisfied alliance customer: how else could I use my frequent flier miles with a European airline to book a reward flight from Canada to Brazil with a US airline? ;-)
In the last Economist article I said pretty much exactly what Gulliver said (about veteran business class flyers preffering the alliances due to loyalty points). It would be nice to get some credit instead of posting it as original.
I think a previous article in the Economist touched on this, but the biggest problem I've encountered with an airline alliance is the (potentially) large difference in service and quality; particularly when you're dealing with a "proper" airline and a regional.
Try going from KLM or Air France to Flybe, for example.
I should point out that business travellers flying business class don't need to worry about not being a member of the frequent flyer club of the airline they are flying on, they will still be treated like royalty.
The true winners from alliances are the economy travellers who fly enough to reach elite status on one programme - they get to use the business class lounge, check in counters, get extra weight etc, i.e. most of the perks of business class travel except the big seat and personalised onboard attention.